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Abstract
The sociology of citizenship is concerned with the social and economic conditions of citizens of a national community.
Drawing on T. H. Marshall’s contribution to the theory of social citizenship this article argues that some groups of migrants
and ethnic minorities in Australia, particularly those from non-British and European Backgrounds, face a number of social
and institutional barriers which prevent them from reaching their full potential as members of Australia’s multicultural
community. Evidence from the Australian Bureau of Statistics Census data shows different socioeconomic outcomes for
migrants from British and European backgrounds compared with migrants from Asian backgrounds, despite having similar
educational qualifications and length of time living in Australia. As such, it is argued that achieving social membership
and inclusion continues to be a struggle for particular groups of migrants. A deeper commitment to the core principles of
citizenship that is beyond mere notions of formal equality is needed if Australia is to address this important social issue.
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1. Introduction
Social theorists have long been interested in the con-
cept of citizenship which links individual entitlement on
the one hand and ideas and attachment to a particular
community on the other (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994). De-
bates about citizenship and multiculturalism are often
sparked by social or political events or crises, which bring
to the fore perceptions of weak ties among a particu-
lar racial, ethnic or religious group to the nation. For ex-
ample, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United
States and Europe’s 2015 refugee crisis, numerous polit-
ical leaders around the world have denounced multicul-
turalism as a failure, and have instead emphasised the
need for migrants to demonstrate their loyalty to the
laws, values and traditions of their country. The resur-
gence of support for far-right wing parties and other pop-
ulist representatives in theWest demonstrates the grow-
ing amount of pressure on governments to withdraw
from progressive and inclusive social citizenship policies
for new migrants.
In order to enjoy full membership, members of mi-
grant and ethnic minority groups have frequently had
to adopt the majority culture through societal pressures
to assimilate. Some groups have found this easier than
others due to cross-cultural differences in terms of lan-
guage, culture, political background and religion. Draw-
ing on theories of social citizenship, this research shows
that since the 1990s there is evidence of differential so-
cioeconomic outcomes for European and non-European
migrants in Australia, particularly in terms of income and
professional employment opportunities relative to edu-
cation. In doing so, this research looks at whether ‘race’
in the form of being ‘white’ or ‘non-white’ is a barrier
to social inclusion. Stephen Castles (2000, p. 41) shows
that through a process of social segmentation and social
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exclusion, various migrant and ethnic minority groups
tend to remain in disadvantaged labourmarket positions,
which is then passed on to subsequent generations. It is
therefore necessary to look at practices of systematic so-
cial exclusion, which can lead to social segmentation and
differential outcomes for particular groups of migrants
and ethnic minority groups.
In Australia, at first glance, the absence of migrants
from non-British or European backgrounds is noticeable
in leadership positions within national institutions and
organisations, suggesting that, even though Australia has
adopted a multicultural citizenship model, attitudes of
racial and ethnic superiority may continue to pervade
Australian institutions and organisations. For example,
according to Soutphommasane (2014), the poor repre-
sentation of Asian Australians in federal politics “appears
to replicate a pattern of invisibility that exists within Aus-
tralian culture”. This pattern of invisibility similarly exists
in other institutions and organisations, particularly at se-
nior levels where important decisions are often made.
While nearly 14 percent of Australians come from non-
British and European backgrounds, such cultural diver-
sity is not represented within the senior leadership posi-
tions in Australian institutions and organisations (AHRC,
2016). This can have flow-on effects in terms of the so-
cial exclusion of citizens from migrant backgrounds in
shaping the future of Australia. To find out whether so-
cial bias and discrimination might be playing a role, us-
ing Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Census data be-
tween 1970 and 2011, this article examines whether
there are any differences in the socioeconomic outcomes
of groups that have similar levels of education and have
lived in Australia for a similar length of time. First, this
article examines theories of social citizenship as a frame-
work for the empirical analysis of the ABS Census data.
2. Theoretical Background
The social construction of citizenship in Western democ-
racies which predominantly focuses on the legal and
political responsibilities of citizens frequently overlooks
the obligations that states have towards their citizens in
terms of providing an inclusive social citizenship that ad-
dresses the reality of racial inequality and social class.
British Sociologist T. H. Marshall divided citizenship into
three dimensions, namely civic, political and social rights
(Marshall, 1950, 1977, 1981). Social rights were insti-
tutionalised in the form of the Welfare state and in-
cluded a range of social entitlements such as education,
health, employment benefits and employment opportu-
nities (Esping-Andersen, 1990). In the incorporation of
social rights within the Welfare state, it was argued that
citizenship could alter patterns of social inequality. In de-
veloping the work of T. H. Marshall, sociologists have
since redefined citizenship “as a set of social practices
which define the nature of social membership” (Turner,
1993, p. 4). While there are many criticisms of T. H. Mar-
shall’s understandings of citizenship such as the fact that
it is historically and culturally specific to Western cul-
tures and framed solely within the confines of the nation-
state (Barbalet, 1988; Hindess, 1993; Janoski, 1998; King
& Waldron, 1988; Ong, 2005), there is no doubt that in
Western democracies groups of citizens with civil and po-
litical rights are denied basic social rights such as equality
of opportunity, employment and income due to various
forms of discrimination and racial prejudice.
In culturally plural societies, migrants and ethnic mi-
norities struggle to attain full membership and social in-
clusion. Talcott Parsons originally defined social inclusion
as the process by which previously excluded groups at-
tain full citizenship or membership in a society (Parsons,
1994, p. 145). Since then, studies have shown a multidi-
mensional approach to understanding full membership
and social inclusion. The World Bank (2007) for instance
defines social inclusion in terms of financial, physical, hu-
man and social capital and emotional and functional sat-
isfaction. Other studies define social inclusion in terms
of material resources, social relations, civic activities, ba-
sic services, neighbourhood inclusion, achievement, par-
ticipation and social connection (Greef, Verté, & Segers,
2015; Ogg, 2005). Migrants and ethnic minorities can be
denied social inclusion due to their cultural background,
linguistic differences, political or religious background or
the distance between their country of origin and host
country (see Dahlstedt & Bevelander, 2010). This article
further looks at social inclusion in terms of income and
occupational status opportunities, both of which can im-
pact on leadership opportunities and levels of autonomy
within an organisation. To be a full member in society,
migrants and ethnic minorities need to have opportu-
nities to not only participate in society but also shape
the future of a society by utilising their various strengths
and skills.
One of the significant barriers for migrants and eth-
nic minorities is the growing demands for linguistic as-
similation in terms of English or national language pro-
ficiency, accent, style and pronunciation which some re-
searchers have viewed as a form of racial discrimination
(Colic-Peisker, 2005; Creese & Kambere, 2003; Hill, 2008;
Piller & Takahashi, 2011). In fact, Piller and Takahashi
(2011, p. 371) observe that “social inclusion policies are
often blind to theways inwhich language proficiency and
language ideologies mediate social inclusion in linguisti-
cally diverse societies”. For instance, in Australia and in
other diverse multicultural societies, migrants and eth-
nic minorities wishing to attain citizenship must demon-
strate English language proficiency in the form of passing
a citizenship test written in English. This is just one hurdle
towards full membership. In applying for a professional
job or a position of leadership, some groups of migrants
and ethnic minorities also need to overcome social bias
due to their place of birth, skin colour, distinctive accent,
etc. While place of birth is not always known, visible and
audible markers such as skin colour and accent are of-
ten used as replacements for social bias (see McCrone
& Bechhofer, 2008). For those with minority group as-
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cribed characteristics, social inclusion and full member-
ship may become an unreachable goal unless the major-
ity accepts various forms of ascribed cultural and linguis-
tic diversity as equal.
3. Citizenship and Social Inclusion
Together with formal modes of citizenship, socioeco-
nomic achievement relative to opportunity is a neces-
sity for the social inclusion and full membership of mi-
grant and ethnic minority groups. Despite detecting a
general pattern of upward socioeconomic mobility over
time, research finds that somemigrant and ethnic minor-
ity groups are less likely to experience upward socioeco-
nomic mobility over time than others, thus providing evi-
dence of social exclusion. In fact, in some cases, theymay
experience downward mobility because of a number of
social and institutional barriers (Basran & Zong, 1998). A
number of reasons emerge from research into the ex-
perience of migrants to explain these disparities. First,
some areas of the labour market could be influenced by
direct and indirect discrimination (Fox, 2013). In these
areas, dominant groups in society exclude other groups
from positions of influence. Weber (1978) referred to
this phenomenon as a form of ‘social closure’, whereby
one group excludes the other from scarce resources, and
in doing so, is able tomaintain the dominant group’s priv-
ilege and social position.
Research evidence suggests that across Western mi-
grant societies, race and birthplace origins can have an
effect on whether or not some groups will experience up-
ward socioeconomicmobility (Bauder, 2003; Frank, 2013;
Valtonen, 2001; Weedon, 2002). This has been shown to
be the case for ‘non-white’ ethnic minorities who, de-
spite having very high levels of education, are particularly
vulnerable to social exclusion. For example, with an over-
all shift from unskilled to skilled migration, higher levels
of socioeconomic status as well as access to professional
and managerial occupations are to be expected among
first-generation migrants, thus negating the traditional
pattern of overall income increase in later generations.
However, this assumes that new skilled migrants do not
face direct or indirect discrimination in the workforce. In-
glis andModel (2007) find that, in contrast to peoplewith
European ancestry, ‘non-white’ migrants and ethnic mi-
norities often remain disadvantaged for several genera-
tions. To examine whether there is a pattern of this oc-
curring in Australia, in the next section this article exam-
ines the socioeconomic outcomes of Asian and European
migrants with similar education backgrounds and length
of stay in Australia. All things being equal, it is expected
that both groups should have similar outcomes in terms
of income and occupational status.
4. Diverse Entry Outcomes for Skilled Migrants
First, it is important to look at overall migration patterns
in Australia in order to establish a contextual understand-
ing of the diverse socioeconomic outcomes of different
groups of migrants in Australia. Results from the ABS
Census in Figure 1 show that over time the patterns
of migration from the United Kingdom have remained
fairly steady, with very little change over four decades
of expansive immigration programs. However, as a pro-
portion of the overseas-born population, their numbers
have steadily declined from 41 percent of the overseas-
born population in 1976 to 21 percent in 2011. There has
been a similar pattern of steady immigration from other
parts of Europe. However, since the 1970s, the propor-
tion of Australia’s overseas-born population in each ma-
jor European group has declined. The sharpest declines
in the proportion of the overseas-born population have
been from the United Kingdom, Italy, former Yugoslavia,
and Greece. For example, the Italian-born now comprise
three percent of the Australian overseas-born popula-
tion, compared with 11 percent in 1971; the Greek-born
now comprise two percent of the Australian overseas-
born population, comparedwith six percent in 1976. The
decline in European migration is partly attributed to eco-
nomic growth in Europe, which has rendered emigration
to Australia less attractive than in the immediate post-
war period.
The pattern of migration of people born in Asian
countries has moved in the opposite direction. For in-
stance, Figure 1 shows the exponential rise in numbers of
migrants from Asian countries. Much of this increase can
be attributed to the rapid growth inmigration fromChina
and India. As a proportion of Australia’s overseas-born
population, the Chinese-born population has increased
from less than one percent in 1971 to six percent in
2011 (see Table 1). One of the contributing factors to
this increase was the Australian government’s decision
to grant temporary and permanent residency status to
students from the People’s Republic of China in the after-
math of the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, which
then brought their family members to Australia through
the family reunion scheme. The Indian-born population
has similarly increased from one percent of the overseas-
born population in 1971 to six percent in 2011 (see Ta-
ble 1). Overall, in 2011 migrants born in Asian countries
comprised 37 percent of the overseas-born population
of Australia, not far behind the numbers of European-
born migrants, who made up 40 percent of the overseas-
born population. In Table 1 it can be seen that within
the Asian group the top source countries are China, In-
dia, Vietnam, Philippines and Malaysia.
In terms of Australia’s population more broadly, the
results in Table 2 show the overall birthplace origins of
the Australian population. The findings show that Aus-
tralia’s migrant population is much more diverse than
in the 1970s when the majority of migrants came from
the United Kingdom or countries in Europe. In recent
times, Australia continues to accept significant numbers
of United Kingdom and European migrants, however,
there has been a significant increase in the numbers of
migrants from Asia (up to 9.2 percent in 2011) and other
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Figure 1. Population of migrants born overseas in Australia, 1971–2011.
Table 1. Population of migrants to Australia from main source countries in Asia, percent, 1971–2011.
1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011
China 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.2 2.1 2.9 3.5 4.7 6.0
India 1.1 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.6 2.0 2.3 3.3 5.6
Vietnam 0.0 0.1 1.4 2.6 3.3 3.9 3.8 3.6 3.5
Philippines 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.0 2.0 2.4 2.5 2.7 3.2
Malaysia 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.5 1.9 2.0 1.9 2.1 2.2
Sri Lanka 0.0 0.6 0.6 0.7 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.6
Korea 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.2 1.4
Indonesia 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2
Total 2,578,963 2,608,109 3,003,798 3,247,423 3,756,441 3,876,709 4,105,637 4,416,029 5,294,150
Overseas-
Born
Population (n)
Source: ABS (2011a).
regions including the Middle East, Africa and the Pacific
Islands (up to 7.4 percent in 2011).
So far, the Census data shows that Australia’s racial
and ethnic make-up is gradually changing over time with
an increase in migrants from non-British and European
backgrounds, many of whommight be classified as ‘non-
white’ in North American or British classification sys-
tems. In Australia, it is difficult to accurately measure
the numbers of ‘non-white’ migrants and ethnic minori-
ties beyond the first-generation because in the Census
the Australian-born are only asked if they have parents
born overseas and not where their parents come from.
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Table 2. Birthplace origins of the Australian population, percent, 1971–2011.
1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011
Australia 79.8 80.6 78.2 77.6 75.5 74.5 72.6 70.9 69.8
United Kingdom 08.2 08.0 07.5 06.9 06.7 06.0 05.5 05.2 05.1
Former UK 01.0 01.4 01.9 02.0 02.4 02.4 02.3 02.7 03.1
Colonies/
Nations
Other Europe 10.3 09.6 08.9 08.3 07.9 07.3 06.6 05.9 05.4
Asia 00.8 01.1 01.7 02.6 04.1 04.8 05.2 06.1 09.2
Other 01.9 02.5 03.4 05.0 07.8 09.2 07.4
Total (12,755,620) (13,437,725) (14,576,294) (15,602,198) (16,850,288) (17,752,874) (18,769,240) (19,855,287) (21,507,719)
Australian
population (n)
Source: ABS (2011a).
However, the Census includes a question about ancestry
among the Australian-born and those born overseas. In
looking at the results in Table 3, the figures show that
0.9 percent of the Australian-born and up to 33 percent
of first-generation migrants identify as having an Asian,
Middle Eastern or Sub-Saharan African ancestry of which
most (though not all) could be classified as ‘non-white’.
Overall, the Asian pan-ethnic group represent the fastest
growing ‘non-white’ group in Australia. As such the re-
mainder of this article focuses on the experiences of
Asian migrants in particular and compares their experi-
ences with migrants from the United Kingdom and other
parts of Europe, of whom the majority in Australia have
British or European ancestry.
In order to demonstrate the diverse socioeconomic
outcomes among European and Asian first-generation
migrants in Australia, the following results present com-
parisons in education, income and occupation of three
separate migrant cohorts from the United Kingdom, Eu-
rope and Asia. Table 4 reveals that a higher proportion
of migrants from Asia than from other countries hold
a bachelor or postgraduate degree, which could be at-
tributed to the fact that a greater proportion of recent
migrants to Australia are arriving as highly skilled mi-
grants who have met the requirements of the competi-
tive points system. Nevertheless, even when the educa-
tion levels of Asian migrants before the 1990s are taken
into account, it is apparent that migrants from Asia are
more likely to hold a university qualification than mi-
grants from other countries. More than 28 percent of
Asian migrants within each of the migration waves other
than Vietnam hold a university qualification (see Table 4).
A smaller proportion of migrants born in the United King-
dom and Europe arriving in the migration wave before
the 1990s hold university degrees.
Given the higher levels of educational attainment
among migrants born in Asia, one would expect there
to be a higher proportion of Asian migrants than Euro-
pean migrants in high-income professional occupations,
particularly among those groups who arrived before the
1990s. However, the findings in Figure 2 show diverse
outcomes for two groups from different regions with a
Table 3. First mentioned ancestry origins of the Australian population, 2011.
Born in Australia Born Overseas
(n) (%) (n) (%)
Oceanian (4,592,267) 37.5 (581,983) 07.4
North-West European (6,774,794) 55.3 (3,051,313) 38.6
Southern and Eastern European (467,499) 03.8 (1,330,608) 16.8
North African and Middle Eastern (43,850) 00.4 (409,155) 05.2
South-East Asian (7,285) 00.1 (525,321) 06.6
North-East Asian (35,675) 00.3 (894,412) 11.3
Southern and Central Asian (7,966) 00.1 (627,908) 07.9
Peoples of the Americas (7,049) 00.1 (118,184) 01.5
Sub-Saharan African (3,560) 00.0 (149,927) 01.9
Other (16,203) 00.1 (45,481) 00.6
Not Stated (291,698) 02.4 (166,895) 02.1
Total overseas born (n) (12,247,846) 100 (7,901,187) 100
Source: ABS (2011a).
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Table 4.Migrants in Australia with a university education, by year of arrival, percent.
<1990s 1991–2000 2001–2011 (n)
UK
England 20 30 22 (125,778)
Scotland 18 32 27 (16,388)
Wales 23 36 31 (4,692)
Northern Ireland 21 42 34 (3,366)
Other Europe
Italy 5 21 24 (7,300)
Former Yugoslavia 6 17 12 (12,493)
Germany 14 28 26 (11,016)
Greece 5 11 9 (4,328)
Netherland 12 31 23 (7,061)
Ireland 22 37 29 (8,535)
Poland 23 37 48 (10,655)
Malta 4 14 12 (1,494)
Asia
China 28 41 48 (54,866)
India 36 58 60 (66,376)
Vietnam 20 13 17 (25,532)
Philippines 38 34 36 (40,418)
Malaysia 48 47 38 (25,815)
Sri Lanka 34 40 40 (19,974)
Korea 40 42 32 (10,901)
Indonesia 31 44 37 (8,445)
Source: ABS (2011a).
similar education and period of arrival in Australia in-
dicating that for some groups there might be barriers
to reaching their full potential. In terms of income, for
those who have lived in Australia since before the 1990s,
the outcomes for Asian migrants and migrants from the
United Kingdom are fairly similar, showing that over time
Asian migrants eventually catch up to other groups and
even overtake other groups such as those from other
parts of Europe.
For new migrants, the story is very different. New
migrants from the United Kingdom tend to receive a
much greater return on their education than new mi-
grants from Asia. Over 30 percent of recent arrivals
from the United Kingdom are employed in the highest-
income bracket. The proportions of new migrants from
Asian countries in the highest-income bracket are much
smaller, with only 14 percent of Asian migrants in the
highest-income bracket. It is possible that the differences
in entry earnings capacity among recent Asian cohorts
could be explained by the heightened emphasis on En-
glish language ability. However, given that skilled mi-
grants from Asia, especially those with a university ed-
ucation, are usually fluent in English, this is less likely to
explain the variation. Instead, it is more likely that other
factors could be playing a role such as skin colour, accent
or simply employer-based discrimination.
Another explanationmight be related to the fact that
many Asian migrants are students without Australian cit-
izenship. However, while the majority of overseas stu-
dents from Asia do not have citizenship, the results in
Figure 2 only look at the experiences of migrants with
citizenship. In looking at whether there are differences
among those with citizenship and those without citizen-
ship, the results in Figure 3 show that a higher propor-
tion of newmigrants from the United Kingdom and other
parts of Europe earn a high income compared to the
Asian cohort. Only six percent of recent arrivals fromAsia
without citizenship earn a high income compared to 28
percent of those from the United Kingdom and 19 per-
cent of those from other parts of Europe. Asian migrants
who arrived before 1990 end up doing comparatively bet-
ter but it appears that it takes longer to achieve similar
or better outcomes in terms of income status than their
European counterparts.
The differences in outcomes might be explained by
a number of other factors. For example, it is possible
that the earlier cohort of Asian migrants to Australia
who arrived before 1990 came from different origin
countries than those who have arrived later. For ex-
ample, we might expect those from English-speaking
Hong Kong to have better outcomes than recent arrivals
from non-English speaking countries in Asia. There are
also likely to be differences among those from English-
speaking Northern European countries and those from
non-English speaking European countries in Southern
and Eastern Europe. To explore this in a more detail, a re-
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Figure 2. Percentage of migrant citizens on high incomes by year of arrival.
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Figure 3. Percentage of migrants without citizenship on high incomes by year of arrival.
gression analysis is conducted to control for background
factors such as English proficiency, timing of arrival, age,
education, gender and citizenship status to determine
whether there is a correlation between country origins
and income status.
Table 5 draws on a sample from the 2011 Census,
which is provided in the confidential unit record files
(CURFs) and is based on a one percent sample of the Cen-
sus population. The effects of country origins and tim-
ing of arrival is clearly evident in the multivariate results
Social Inclusion, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 1, Pages 32–44 38
shown in Table 5. In terms of birthplace, migrants from
South Asia and North-East Asia, as well as Southern and
Eastern Europe, are less likely to earn a high income com-
pared to migrants from the United Kingdom and North-
ern Europe. Newer arrivals are also less likely to earn a
high income compared to migrants from previous migra-
tion waves, as the earlier findings demonstrate.
Up to 45 percent of the total sample of South Asians
and 70 percent of new arrivals from South Asia have com-
pleted a bachelor degree or higher such as a postgradu-
ate degree. This compares with 38 percent of the total
sample of North-East Asians and 70 percent of new ar-
rivals from North-East Asia. Among the total sample of
Northern Europeans, only 24 percent have completed a
bachelor degree or higher and among the new arrivals
from the Northern Europe only 55 percent have com-
pleted a bachelor degree or higher. This is significantly
less than the proportions of thosewith a bachelor degree
or higher from South Asia and North-East Asia (70 per-
cent). With such differences in the percentage of those
with university education qualifications between those
from Asia and those from Northern Europe, one would
expect a positive relationship between Asian country ori-
gins and income status. Instead, the opposite is the case,
indicating the possible existence of racial or ethnic dis-
crimination.
Table 5. OLS Regression Model estimating effects of origins and background on income, Census, 2011.
(B) (β) Sig.
Constant 2.61 0.00
Birthplace
South-Asia −0.68 −0.09 0.00
North-East Asia −1.22 −0.16 0.00
South-East Asia −0.04 −0.01 0.86
Southern and Eastern Europe −0.67 −0.07 0.00
Ancestry of Parent 1
Southern and Central Asia −0.27 −0.04 0.14
North-East Asia −0.26 −0.04 0.26
South-East Asia −0.39 −0.04 0.10
Southern and Eastern Europe −0.35 −0.04 0.03
Ancestry of Parent 2
Southern and Central Asia −0.17 −0.01 0.56
North-East Asia −0.38 −0.01 0.33
South-East Asia −0.68 −0.02 0.01
Southern and Eastern Europe −0.07 −0.00 0.76
Language Spoken at Home
Southern Asian Languages −0.44 −0.06 0.03
Eastern Asian Languages −0.59 −0.08 0.04
South-East Asian Languages −0.10 −0.01 0.73
Southern European languages −0.55 −0.07 0.00
Northern European Languages −1.28 −0.10 0.00
English Proficiency
Very Well or Well −1.44 −0.12 0.00
Timing of Arrival
Arrived 2000 or before −1.02 −0.17 0.00
Arrived 2001–2005 −0.71 −0.08 0.00
Background
Age −0.09 −0.09 0.00
Education −0.53 −0.23 0.00
Gender −1.37 −0.22 0.00
Citizenship −0.84 −0.13 0.00
Adjusted R2 −0.18
N (11,979)
Source: ABS (2011b). (N = 11,979). B: Unstandardised regression coefficient. β: Standardised regression coefficient. See Table A.1 in the
Appendix for coding of variables.
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In terms of occupational status, Table 6 finds a simi-
lar outcome. Given that a higher percentage of migrants
from Asia in the CURF sample have a university educa-
tion compared to migrants from Northern Europe, one
might expect a higher percentage of migrants from Asia
to be employed in a professional occupation. However,
the findings in Table 6 indicate the opposite to be the
case with a negative relationship between South Asian
and North-East Asian birthplace origins and professional
occupation status. For instance, the odds ratios (Exp (B))
are less than 1, showing that those from South Asia and
North-East Asia are less likely to be employed as profes-
sionals compared to those from Northern Europe, even
after controlling for language spoken at home, English
proficiency, timing of arrival, education, age and citizen-
ship status. The odds ratios are also highly significant
(sig.=.000). This pattern suggests that migrants from the
United Kingdom and Northern Europe, despite having
lower levels of educational attainment, are more easily
able to move into high-income professional occupations
shortly after their arrival in Australia.
5. Discussion
The findings presented reveal that there are several barri-
ers to a high income and occupational status among new
Table 6. Logistic Regression Model estimating effects of origins and background on occupation, census, 2011.
B SE Sig. Exp(B)
Constant −4.06 0.21 0.00 0.02
Birthplace
South-Asia −0.93 0.14 0.00 0.40
North-East Asia −0.70 0.23 0.00 0.50
South-East Asia −0.12 0.22 0.57 0.88
Southern and Eastern Europe −0.08 0.15 0.59 0.92
Ancestry of Parent 1
Southern and Central Asia −0.53 0.17 0.00 1.70
North-East Asia −0.24 0.21 0.26 1.27
South-East Asia −0.08 0.23 0.73 1.08
Southern and Eastern Europe −0.05 0.16 0.75 0.95
Ancestry of Parent 2
Southern and Central Asia −0.00 0.29 0.99 1.00
North-East Asia −0.13 0.37 0.73 0.88
South-East Asia −0.07 0.24 0.79 1.07
Southern and Eastern Europe −0.43 0.23 0.06 0.65
Language Spoken at Home
Southern Asian Languages −0.03 0.19 0.89 1.03
Eastern Asian Languages −0.61 0.26 0.02 1.84
South-East Asian Languages −0.26 0.26 0.32 0.77
Southern European languages −0.26 0.12 0.03 1.30
Northern European Languages −0.81 0.13 0.00 2.25
English Proficiency
Very Well or Well −1.30 0.18 0.00 3.66
Timing of Arrival
Arrived 2000 or before −0.32 0.09 0.00 1.37
Arrived 2001–2005 −0.21 0.08 0.01 1.24
Background
Age −0.02 0.01 0.11 1.02
Education −0.70 0.02 0.00 2.02
Gender −0.14 0.05 0.01 1.15
Citizenship −0.27 0.07 0.00 1.31
Nagelkerke R square −0.25
N −8,386
Source: ABS (2011b). (N=11,979). B: Coefficient for the Constant. SE: Standard Error Around the Constant. Exp(B): Odds Ratio. See Table
A.1 in the Appendix for coding of variables.
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migrant groups, even for those groups with high levels
of education, which result in ethnic labour market seg-
mentation and social exclusion. In terms of income, new
migrants from Asia in Australia are less likely to enter
professional or managerial positions with a high income
than new migrants from Northern Europe. Because the
ABS Census survey does not ask whether migrants ob-
tained their educational qualifications in Australia, it is
difficult to determine whether there is an issue with the
recognition of overseas qualifications or whether racial
and ethnic discrimination is affecting the socioeconomic
outcomes of migrant groups.
Research in Canada has shown that employers in
Canada tend to favour migrants from English-speaking
countries with comparable training systems (Hawthorne,
2007). Consequently, ‘non-white’ ethnic minorities from
Asia often find that their skills are either not recognised
or devalued. A similar phenomenon occurs in Australia,
given that the qualifications and requirements to work
in Australia depend on the type of occupation. Assessing
overseas qualifications for employment purposes is usu-
ally a separate process to applying for a job where, as
in all occupations, the employer decides whom they will
employ. This tends to ensure that, as in Canada, employ-
ers can devalue legitimate qualifications and skills (i.e.
human capital) held by ‘non-white’ migrant and ethnic
minorities from Asia.
Comparative research has shown that employers
tend to be less inclined to hire a migrant than a loc-
ally-born candidate (Heath & Cheung, 2007; Lindbeck
& Snower, 1988). These forms of discrimination are
thought to originate from the idea that people gen-
erally identify more with people who look like them-
selves (Lancee, 2012). For example, in his seminal work,
Becker (1971) argued that ‘personal preferences’ or
‘tastes for discrimination’ on the part of employers and
organisations were the main reasons for labour mar-
ket discrimination.
In a 2012 study on discrimination in Australia, Booth
et al. compared employer attitudes to Anglo Saxon
Australians with employer attitudes to Indigenous Aus-
tralians, Italian Australians, Middle Eastern Australians
and Chinese Australians (Booth, Leigh, & Varganova,
2012). As part of their experiment, the researchers ap-
plied for entry-level jobs using distinctively Anglo Saxon,
Indigenous Australian, Italian, Chinese and Middle East-
ern surnames. Their study found that applications sub-
mitted to employers with Anglo Saxon names had a
mean callback rate from potential employers of 35 per-
cent. Applications with Italian surnames had a slightly
lower callback rate of 32 percent, and those with distinc-
tively Chinese and Middle Eastern surnames had mean
callback rates of 21 and 22 percent respectively. Chinese
applicants in Sydney hoping to get an interview would
have to put in 92 percent more applications than appli-
cantswith Anglo Saxon names (Booth et al., 2012, p. 567).
Racial and ethnic discrimination, therefore, may prevent
highly educated migrants from gaining professional em-
ployment opportunities with high incomes and potential
leadership opportunities.
Another approach to explain the labourmarket differ-
ences found in this research is to consider social capital
theory, which implies that migrants who are equipped
with social resources (i.e. social networks and resources
of others) perform better in the labour market (Aguilera,
2002; Flap & Völker, 2004; Franzen & Hangartner, 2006).
Social capital in terms of social networks and the re-
sources of others provides an important gateway into the
labour market. One way to further understand the influ-
ence of social capital is by distinguishing between ‘bond-
ing’ and ‘bridging’ capital (Leonard & Onyx, 2003; Put-
nam, 2000; Schuller, 2007; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000).
Bonding capital refers to social networks formed ‘within’
groups and bridging capital refers to social networks
formed ‘between’ groups. According to Lancee (2012, p.
159), the acquisition of bridging capital tends to result
in higher income and occupational status whereas the
acquisition of bonding capital (such as those formed by
established family or co-ethnic networks) does not.
On the surface, it seems thatmigrants from countries
with similar cultural, political and historical ties to Aus-
tralia’s ‘white’ British and Northern European majority
are more quickly and more easily able to transfer their
education, skills and experience. This may partly explain
why Asian migrants face greater challenges in gaining
meaningful employment in line with their educational
qualifications, skills, and experience in the initial pe-
riod after their arrival. It does not, however, explain the
whole picture. This is because many Asian migrants have
in fact gained appropriate qualifications since arriving in
Australia, or hold quality qualifications from internation-
ally recognised higher education institutions in Western
democracies. Alternatively, many have been successfully
awarded qualification recognition by the Australian gov-
ernment or a peak industry body for holding one ormore
qualifications from internationally recognised higher ed-
ucation institutions within their own country. However,
as mentioned, the requirements to work in Australia de-
pend on the occupation and local employer organisa-
tions. The employer alone decides whom they will em-
ploy, regardless of the applicant’s qualifications and skills.
This leaves new migrants highly vulnerable to the atti-
tudes of employers.
In summary, the findings presented suggest that
there are a number of barriers to a high socioeconomic
status among newmigrant groups, even for those groups
with high levels of education, which result in racial and
ethnic labour market segmentation. In terms of income,
new migrants from Asia in Australia are less likely to en-
ter professional and managerial positions with a high in-
come than new migrants from the United Kingdom. Be-
cause the ABS Census survey does not ask whether cit-
izens obtained their educational qualifications in Aus-
tralia, it is difficult to determine whether there is an is-
sue with the employer recognition of foreign qualifica-
tions or whether racial and ethnic discrimination is af-
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fecting the socioeconomic outcomes of migrant groups.
However, the results do suggest that racial and ethnic dis-
crimination may prevent highly educated migrants from
non-British or European backgrounds from gaining pro-
fessional employment opportunities with high incomes
and potential leadership opportunities. It is therefore im-
portant to ensure that university-educated and experi-
enced non-British and Europeanmigrants are not denied
full membership in terms of social citizenship and are
able to contribute meaningfully within Australia’s lead-
ership ranks and the future direction of the country.
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Appendix
Table A.1. Coding of variables for Table 5 and Table 6.
Variable Scoring
Income 12-point scale, Low Income=1, High Income=12
Birthplace
South-Asia Southern and Central Asia=1, Else=0
North-East Asia North-East Asia=1, Else=0
South-East Asia South-East Asia=1, Else=0
Southern and Eastern Europe Southern and Eastern Europe=1, Else=0
Reference Category is North-West Europe
Ancestry of Parent 1 Southern and Central Asia Southern and Central Asia=1, Else=0
North-East Asia North-East Asia=1, Else=0
South-East Asia South-East Asia=1, Else=0
Southern and Eastern Europe Southern and Eastern Europe=1, Else=0
Reference Category is North-West Europe
Ancestry of Parent 2
Southern and Central Asia Southern and Central Asia=1, Else=0
North-East Asia North-East Asia=1, Else=0
South-East Asia South-East Asia=1, Else=0
Southern and Eastern Europe Southern and Eastern Europe=1, Else=0
Reference Category is North-West Europe
Language Spoken at Home
Southern Asian Languages Southern Asian Languages=1, Else=0
Eastern Asian Languages Eastern Asian Languages=1, Else=0
South-East Asian Languages South-East Asian Languages=1, Else=0
Southern European languages Southern European languages=1, Else=0
Northern European Languages Northern European Languages excl. English=1, Else=0
Reference Category is English
English Proficiency
Very Well or Well Very Well, Well=1, Not Well, Not at All=0
Timing of Arrival
Arrived 2000 or before Arrived 2000 or before, Else=0
Arrived 2001–2005 Arrived 2001–2005, Else=0
Reference Category is Arrived 2006–2011
Background
Age 1=18–24, 2=25–29, 3=30–34, 4=35–39, 5=40–44, 6=45–49,
7=50–54, 8=55–59, 9=60–64, 10=65–69, 11=70–74, 12=75-79,
13=80-84, 14=85 and over.
Education Certificate=1, Diploma=2, Bachelor’s Degree=3,
Graduate Diploma=4, Postgraduate Degree=5.
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